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Abstract: Using Swedish micro data, this paper examines the determinants of the incidence 
of, and the amount of, job-related training. The analysis is performed by estimating probit, 
count data and hurdle models with a set of explanatory variables chosen on a theoretical basis. 
The results show that the determinants of the probability of receiving training and the 
determinants of the amount of training not are the same.  
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1 Introduction 
 
Formal on-the-job training plays an important role in improving the skills of those in the 
labour force. According to Statistics Sweden, who investigate the size of employer-provided 
training, slightly less than 3 per cent of the GDP is used for training employees and 
approximately 40 per cent of all employed undertake some kind of job-related training every 
six months (Statistics Sweden, 1999). Data from Statistics Sweden (1992, 1995) also show 
that there are substantial differences in the incidence of on-the-job training between groups in 
the labour market. For example, on-the-job training seems to be most common among the 
middle-aged, workers in the public sector, and among individuals who work full-time. 
Moreover, women receive less training on average than men.  
SOU (1991) stresses the importance of training as a complement to schooling, but also 
points out that training at the job increases the existing individual differences in educational 
background if those who are already well-educated get more training on average than those 
with shorter school education.   
However, the information above is based on the uncontrolled means and it is of interest 
to see if the patterns appearing in these means are also true when covariates are controlled for. 
Several studies have shown that on-the-job training has a positive effect on wages, see e.g. 
Lynch (1992) who uses US data. Also Regnér (1995, 1997), using Swedish data, has shown 
that on-the-job training impacts on wage levels. Consequently, for several reasons it is of 
great interest to know who receives on-the-job training and who does not. Few studies have 
paid attention to the factors that determine the incidence of on-the-job training, i.e. who 
receives on-the-job training and who does not. Although there are studies that investigate the 
probability of receiving on-the-job training, or the issue of job-matching and on-the-job 
training, or both, no comparable Swedish study that examines the probability of receiving on-
the-job training has been found.  
Barron, Black and Loewenstein (1989) go into the matter of job-matching and on-the-
job training using US survey data. Their results show that on-the-job training is uncorrelated 
with starting wages and they claim that the incidence of on-the-job training depends on 
selection of high-ability workers to positions where training is substantial.   
Booth (1991) examines the probability of receiving job-related formal training and the 
returns to on-the-job training in Britain using a sample containing personal, educational and 
firm characteristics and by performing logit estimations. A positive relationship between  
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education and on-the-job training is found as are negative relationships between age and 
training and private sector and training. The results also indicate large gender differences. 
Performing separate estimations for men and women shows that women are, on average and 
conditional on covariates, less likely than men to receive on-the-job training. The training 
incidence is also shown to have a large impact on earnings.  
Arulampalam & Booth (1997) have examined the probability of receiving training using 
a British data set and modelling the number of training occurrences with the purpose of 
finding out why there are individual differences in the probability of receiving training, to 
what extent ability and education contribute to repeated occurrences of work-related training, 
and if there are any gender differences. The results show that education is important for 
obtaining on-the-job training and significant gender differences are found. Moreover they find 
that members of trade unions are more likely to take part in on-the-job training than non-
members. A second goal is to investigate whether there is any evidence of a low skill, bad job 
trap in Britain. Strong complementarity between education and training is found and they 
come to the conclusion that this trap does exist to some extent.  
The same results about education and gender are also found in a recent study by Goux 
& Maurin (2000) using French data. Their results also support the suggested positive 
relationship between firm size and training and show that the individual’s position within the 
firm seems to be important for the incidence of on-the-job training. Their conclusion is that 
on-the-job training is more common if you are at a higher level in the hierarchy. 
The purpose of this paper is to obtain an understanding of which factors determine 
whether an individual receives on-the-job training or not and the amount of training received. 
Three kinds of estimation methods will be used on Swedish micro data from 1991. To see 
what determines the incidence of on-the-job training, a probit model is estimated. The 
determinants of the amount of training received is then estimated with a count data model, 
since the number of on-the-job training days is a variable that takes only non-negative integer 
values. Finally, the suggestion that there are two separate mechanisms affecting the on-the-job 
training incidence and the number of training days will be evaluated by using a hurdle 
specification.  
The paper is organised as follows. The next section deals with theory concerning on-
the-job training. In the third section the data is presented and in the fourth section, the 
estimation methods and the results from the estimations are discussed. Finally, the fifth 
section summarises and concludes with the main results of the study.  
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2 The theoretical framework 
 
Human capital theory will be the basis for the forthcoming analysis (see Becker, 1964), but 
other theories will also be used in order to attempt to discover which factors that are 
theoretically likely to affect the probability of receiving formal on-the-job training.  
According to human capital theory, agents will invest in training if the discounted net 
present value of training benefits exceeds training costs. For the individual, the decision to 
take part in training is made on expectations about the costs for training, i.e. no or lower 
wages during the training period, and about the benefits in terms of higher wages after 
training. For the employer, the decision is made on expectations about the benefits in the form 
of raised post-training productivity and the costs for lost productivity during the training 
period and perhaps also costs for the training itself.  
In the case of general training, if the company pays for the training and the worker later 
leaves the company, the company will lose the returns to the investment. The worker on the 
other hand, will be willing to pay since he can use his general knowledge in other companies. 
Consequently the costs for general training will be born by the worker. In the case of specific 
training, the worker’s alternative wage is not altered and hence, he will not be willing to pay 
the full price for the training since the returns will be lost in case of a lay-off. The employer 
will not be willing to pay either since he loses if the worker quits. The solution is that the 
worker and the employer share the costs for specific training, a solution that also provides an 
incentive for the worker to stay at the company and for the company to keep the worker, i.e. it 
increases tenure and reduces turn-over.  
In the case of employer-provided training the above reasoning implies that the incidence 
of on-the-job training can be assumed to depend both on the employer as well as the 
employee. The individual’s cost for on-the-job  training consists theoretically, as mentioned 
before, of lower wages during the training period. On the other hand, future wages have to be 
higher since otherwise no worker would be willing to invest in training. This means that 
compared to occupations with no on-the-job training, occupations that contain on-the-job 
training will have lower starting wages. After the training period, the wage will increase and 
will eventually exceed the wage for occupations with no on-the-job training. Nevertheless, a 
positive relationship between wages and on-the-job training is also possible. If marginal taxes 
are high, on-the-job training can be a valuable, non-pecuniary compensation that is more  
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appreciated by the employee than a pecuniary compensation, see e.g. Granqvist (1998) for an 
examination of fringe benefits.  
Since the employer wants to maximise his returns on the investment in on-the-job 
training, i.e. raise production as much as possible, part-time workers can be assumed to have a 
smaller probability of receiving on-the-job training. Also workers who are perceived to have 
higher turn -over rates should be less likely than other workers to receive employer-provided 
training. For the same reason gender differences in employer-provided training are possible. 
If, on average, women are more likely to be absent from work, for example due to greater 
family responsibilities, the employer’s incentives for investing in training will be lower for 
women than for men. There is also a possibility that on-the-job training can be used as a tool 
for discrimination. 
Another implication of human capital theory is that individuals who learn quickly, i.e. 
the ones with the highest ability who have a low cost for learning, would be more likely to 
take part in training since they are associated with lower costs for training. It is likely that 
these quick learners are the same individuals who have also invested in higher education and 
hence, formal education is expected to be positively correlated with on-the-job training. Still, 
it should  be taken into consideration that some ability bias probably affects the estimated 
effect of education and therefore the effects of education may be overestimated (for an 
examination of ability bias using Swedish data see e.g. Kjellström, 1999). Since human 
capital theory suggests that both formal education and on-the-job training should take place 
when the individual is young so that the return on the investment can be recouped over a 
longer time period, age and training are likely to be negatively correlated. 
An alternative to human capital theory is the argument of screening. According to this 
theory, employers compensate the lack of information about an individual’s true capacity by 
using the individual’s formal education, i.e. schooling, as a screening d evice to sort out those 
with the highest ability. In the case of training, rational employers use former school 
education as a screening device to detect the most suitable for training, i.e. those who are 
quick learners and hence have a lower cost for learning. Employees in their turn will use their 
education as a signal of their productivity.  
Due to the concept of complementary effects, individuals with a greater capacity to 
learn probably acquire larger stocks of both general and specific human capital. Oi (1983, 
pp.72-73) argues that the firms will gain from hiring more able workers since their general 
human capital will have a complementary effect on the productivity of specific human capital.  
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  To sum up, both these arguments support the positive relationship between school 
education and training that was suggested by human capital theory, but on other grounds. 
The size of the company where the individual is working is most likely to affect the 
probability of receiving on-the-job training. Larger compani es may have lower training costs 
per employee than smaller firms because they can spread fixed costs for training over a large 
group of employees. The production loss of having one additional worker in training is 
probably also lower for larger firms.  
The labour market sectors are also likely to affect the probability. It is reasonable to 
think that if private sector firms are more constrained by the need to make profits than public 
sector firms, which probably is the case, then private sector firms will b e less willing to 
finance training than public sector firms, see Booth (1991). Therefore, compared to working 
in the public sector, working in the private sector might have a negative impact on the 
probability of receiving training. 
Besides sector, there are an institutional factor that might influence the incidence of on-
the-job training namely the power of unions. In union establishments, employer incentives to 
provide training could be low due to high wages. If minimum wages are high, employers 
might not be able to afford to provide training since the necessary lowering of wages during 
the training period is not allowed. On the other hand, unions want to improve the situation of 
their members. Arulampalam & Booth (1997) argue that unions might be co-operative and 
thereby increase training and productivity. Also, unions might be able to increase both wages 
and training through negotiation. Consequently, the impact of belonging to a union can be 
either negative or positive.  
Now again consider the impact of education. A positive relationship between education 
and training has been suggested, but what happens to those who have poor educations? 
Burdett & Smith (1995) have shown that if there is a high proportion of uneducated workers, 
firms’ incentives to provide jobs requiring training will be small and if there are few good 
jobs, workers may have little incentive to obtain higher skills. This results in a skills-
segmented labour market where some individuals will get caught in low productivity with 
small chances to receive on-the-job training and consequently smaller chances for good 
performance on the labour market. They are said to get caught in a low skill, bad job trap. 
Complementarity between education and on-the-job training, i.e. if education and on-the-job 
training are positively correlated, is an indication of the existence of a bad job trap.  
The largest association of trade unions in Sweden – LO – (represents the blue-collar 
workers) conducts surveys to describe the working situation of their members and non- 
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members in terms of freedom in work, chances for on-the-job training etc. (see 
Landsorganisationen i Sverige, 1999). The survey referred to here shows that, on average, 
employees in higher paying jobs have more freedom in their work. For example, they can 
decide their own working methods to a greater extent, they have flexible working hours, they 
receive more on-the-job training and they have altogether a greater influence on their working 
situation, while low-paid workers do not have the same opportunities. If the labour market is 
segmented, it is likely that individuals with more freedom in work are more likely to receive 
on-the-job training since they work in areas where on-the-job training is substantial. Hence, 
some workplace characteristics describing the individual’s working situation can be supposed 
to be correlated to the probability of receiving training.  
 
3 Data  
 
The data that has been used is from the Swedish Level of Living Survey 1991.
 The complete 
database contains information about a random sample of approximately 6,000 people between 
the ages of 18-75 (for more details see Fritzell & Lundberg, 1994). This study focuses on 
employed individuals aged 18-64, except for self-employed and farmers who have been 
excluded since they are considered to work under other conditions than the rest of the 
population. Only the respondents who have answered all of the relevant questions are 
included. After these limitations, the sample consists of slightly less than 3,000 individuals.  
Two different dependent variables will be used in the following estimations. The first 
dependent variable takes the value one if the individual received any formal on-the-job 
training during the past twelve months before the interview and zero otherwise. The second 
dependent variable is discrete and measures the number of days of on-the-job training 
received during the last twelve months. The explanatory variables have been chosen on basis 
of the theoretical explanations and their following implications together with the experiences 
from the studies mentioned in the introduction. The variables used, their definitions and mean 
characteristics can be seen in Table 1. 
As can be seen from Table 1, there are three kinds of individual characteristics, namely 
gender, age and education level.
1 Other variables used are firm size, part-time working,  
                                                                   
1 The education levels correspond to the following Swedish terms: folkskola, real- eller grundskola, 
studentexamen and akademisk examen. For further information about the education levels, see SOFI (1998).   
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Table 1. Definitions and mean characteristics 
Variable  Definition    Mean (standard deviation) 
    All  Men  Women 
Dependent variable 1  1 if on-the-job training during the last 12 
months 
0.444  0.473  0.413 
Dependent variable 2  No. of on-the-job training days during the last 
twelve months
 
4.7 (14.2)  5.4 (15.6)  3.9 (12.5) 
Woman  1 if woman  0.488  0  1 
Age  Age in years  39.9 (12.2)  40.1 (12.1)  39.8 (12.2) 
Elementary school   1 if highest education level is elementary 
school 
0.248  0.260  0.235 
Lower school certificate  1 if highest education level is lower school 
certificate  
0.468  0.441  0.498 
Completed high school  1 if highest education level is completed high 
school 
0.187  0.187  0.187 
Academic degree  1 if highest education level is academic 
degree 
0.097  0.112  0.080 
Part-time  1 if working < 35 hours/week  0.224  0.067  0.389 
Small firm  1 if working in a small firm (£19 employees)  0.306  0.271  0.343 
Middle-size firm  1 if working in a middle-size firm (20-99 
employees) 
0.524  0.548  0.500 
Large firm  1 if working in a large firm (‡100 employees)  0.170  0.181  0.157 
Blue-collar, unskilled  1 if individual belongs to this occupational 
group 
0.301  0.255  0.348 
Blue-collar, skilled  As above  0.194  0.269  0.115 
White-collar, unqualified  As above  0.072  0.033  0.113 
White-collar, low-level  As above  0.108  0.079  0.139 
White-collar, middle-level  As above  0.183  0.175  0.192 
White-collar, high-level  As above  0.142  0.189  0.093 
Union member  1 if union member  0.835  0.837  0.832 
Private sector  1 if working in private sector  0.556  0.705  0.400 
Municipal sector  1 if working in municipal sector  0.314  0.156  0.479 
Governmental sector  1 if working in governmental sector  0.130  0.139  0.121 
Learning-time  1 if the time to learn to perform the job 
reasonably well is >3 months 
0.603  0.734  0.465 
Decision-maker  1 if decision-maker at work  0.461  0.504  0.416 
New knowledge   1 if acquiring new knowledge at work   0.484  0.517  0.449 
Number of observations    2961  1517  1444 
Note: Table 3 shows the frequency distribution for the number of training days.  
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occupational group, sector, union membership and some indicators of the workplace. These 
three workplace characteristics are used as a measure of the individual’s working situation. 
The first one called “Learning-time” can be seen as an indicator of a low skill or high skill 
job. The second, called “Decision-maker”, measures the individual’s responsibilities and the 
third one, “New knowledge”, is used as an indicator of the individual’s opportunities to 
progress. They are all likely to be positively correlated with on-the-job training.
2  
The public sector is divided into two parts, governmental and municipal. There are two 
reasons for this. First, the governmental and the municipal sector have been shown to differ to 
some extent in the returns to human capital (e.g. Zetterberg, 1994). Second, data from 
Statistics Sweden (1992, 1995) show that on-the-job training is more common in the 
governmental sector than in the municipal sector. It might therefore be interesting to see 
whether these two parts of the public sector also differ here. The occupational groups are 
based on the Socio-Economic Classification ( Socio-ekonomisk indelning, SEI), which is a 
vertical classification.
3 
According to the theoretical framework in Section 2, starting wages are supposed to be 
negatively correlated with on-the-job training. However, this requires a measure of starting 
wages, which is not available here. Also, since on-the-job training generally is expected to 
cause wage increases and not the other way around, it seems reasonable not to include a wage 
variable.
4 Besides education, no measure for ability is available.  
Variables that have been tried out but then excluded are working experience and tenure. 
Working experience was used instead of age but came out insignificant in all estimations. 
Also tenure has been shown not to affect either the incidence or the amount of training in 
these models. Just as for wages, there is a causality problem concerning tenure since on-the-
job training generally is suggested to increase tenure, though the reverse relationship would 
be possible if employers reward long time employees.
5  
 
                                                                   
2 The workplace characteristics used here are just a few examples of the autonomy variables available. The data 
set also contains variables describing the individual’s working environment in terms of noise, stress, physical 
and mental efforts etc. that have been experimented with but not are used in the final estimations since they 
seldom are significant.  
3 See SOFI (1998) for a further description of SEI. For the first occupational group, the SEI codes 11 and 12 are 
used, for the second the codes 21 and 22, for the third code 33, for the fourth codes 35 and 36, for the fifth codes 
45 and 46 and for the sixth group codes 56 and 57 are used. 
4 Barron et al. (1989) also argues that the relationship between training and the sta rting wage is ambiguous. 
5 To test the effect of tenure in another way, separate estimations for one group with up to 2 years of tenure and 
one with more than 2 years tenure have been performed. The estimates are very similar to the ones for the whole 
sample.  
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4 Empirical analysis 
 
4.1 Probit Estimation 
Assume there is a latent variable di
* describing individual i:s desire to participate in at least 
one on-the-job training course. We define 
 
d X i i i
* = +  
'b e                          (1) 
                                                                                       
where Xi' is a vector of explanatory variables with  the associated  b vector and ei is an error 
term. What is observed here is a dummy variable defined as    
 
di
i =R S T
1 0       if d * >
0      otherwise  .
                          (2) 
 
Hence, the model estimated has a binary dependent variable di that consists of two possible 
outcomes and the observed di are realisations of a binomial process with a probability that 
varies from trial to trial depending on the set of explanatory variables.  
The likelihood function is given by 
 





= = ￿ ￿
1 0
1 b g                         (3) 
 
where P is the probability of receiving on-the-job training. The estimation method used is 
probit (see e.g. Greene, 1997) where the estimations are undertaken by maximum likelihood. 
Both the estimated coefficients and the marginal effects are presented. The marginal effects 
are evaluated at the means of the regressors and estimate the change in probability due to a 
unit change in the regressor,  ceteris paribus. For dummy variables, the marginal effect 
estimates the change in probability for the discrete change in the dummy from zero to one.  
The results from the probit estimation can be seen in  Table 2. Considering the 
individual characteristics, the gender effect is not significant and education level does not 
seem to have as strong an impact as could be expected from theory. However, one education   
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Table 2. Estimated coefficients and marginal effects from probit estimation. The dependent variable   
takes the value one if the individual has received formal on-the-job training during the last twelve months  
and zero otherwise. Robust standard errors within parentheses 
Variable  Coefficient  Marginal effect 
     
Constant  -2.021 (0.287) **  … 
     
Individual characteristics     
Woman  -0.051 (0.058)  -0.020 (0.023) 
     
Age   0.044 (0.014) **   0.017 (0.006) ** 
Age
2 /100  -0.056 (0.017) **  -0.022 (0.007) ** 
     
Elementary school  Ref.  Ref. 
Lower school certificate   0.083 (0.071)   0.033 (0.028) 
Completed high school   0.257 (0.092) **   0.102 (0.037) ** 
Academic degree  -0.084 (0.121)  -0.033 (0.047) 
     
Employment characteristics     
Small firm  Ref.  Ref. 
Middle-size firm   0.188 (0.057) **   0.074 (0.022) ** 
Large firm   0.243 (0.076) **   0.096 (0.030) ** 
     
Part-time  -0.133 (0.066) *  -0.052 (0.026) * 
     
Blue-collar, unskilled  Ref.  Ref. 
Blue-collar, skilled  -0.013 (0.075)  -0.005 (0.030) 
White-collar, unqualified   0.241 (0.102) *   0.096 (0.041) * 
White-collar, low-level   0.355 (0.093) **   0.141 (0.036) ** 
White-collar, middle-level   0.347 (0.085) **   0.138 (0.034) ** 
White-collar, high-level   0.410 (0.111) **   0.162 (0.047) ** 
     
Institutional factors     
Private sector  Ref.  Ref. 
Municipal sector   0.106 (0.061)   0.042 (0.025) 
Governmental sector   0.199 (0.078) *   0.079 (0.030) * 
     
Union member   0.353 (0.071) **   0.135 (0.026) ** 
     
Workplace characteristics     
Learning-time   0.251 (0.059) **   0. 098 (0.023) ** 
     
Decision-maker   0.247 (0.055) **   0.097 (0.021) ** 
     
New knowledge   0.222 (0.052) **   0.087 (0.020) ** 
     
Number of observations   2961   2961 
     
** significant at 1% level     
*   significant at 5% level     
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effect is significant; the probability of receiving on-the-job training is about 10 per cent higher 
if the individual has completed high school compared to having completed elementary school 
only, which is the reference group. These first two findings will be discussed further. 
According to theory, a negative correlation between age and training is expected. 
Experimenting with a linear term only, did not give any significant result so a quadratic 
relationship was tried out and here both coefficients are significant at the one per cent level. 
Consequently, the probability of receiving on-the-job training increases with age until a 
maximum point is reached, and then the probability decreases.
6 This estimated relationship 
between age and training seems reasonable. First, younger workers may have a higher job 
mobility and the risk associated with the investment in training is therefore higher, second 
they might not need as much education as older people since they already have the right 
knowledge and third, training can be used as a reward for those who have been employed for 
a longer time period. The oldest workers receive less training than the middle-aged since the 
returns to the investment are very low close to retirement. 
The size of the company seems to have the effect that was  suggested by theory, i.e. 
larger companies more often offer on-the-job training. This result is consistent with the 
findings from the French data used by Goux & Maurin (2000) and Booth (1991) on British 
data. Compared to working in a small firm, working in a middle-size firm leads to a 7 per cent 
higher probability of receiving training and working in a large firm leads to a 10 per cent 
higher probability. The result for part-time workers is also the expected. The probability of 
receiving on-the-job training is about 5 per cent lower for those working part-time compared 
to those working full-time.  
The estimated coefficients of the variables indicating occupational group are all 
significant with positive signs for the white-collar workers compared to unskilled blue-collar 
workers while the effect of skilled blue-collar workers is insignificant. Unqualified white-
collar workers have an on-the-job training probability that is about 10 per cent higher than the 
reference while the following two levels of white-collar workers have around 14 per cent 
higher probability. The highest level of occupation, high-level white-collar worker, has a 
probability that is around 16 per cent higher than the reference. The marginal effects for the 
occupational groups are, compared  to the estimated effects of other variables, rather large and  
                                                                   
6 The maximum point is calculated to be about 39 years.  
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hence have a greater impact on the on-the-job training incidence than those of for example  
firm size or part-time working. 
Now consider the institutional factors. Working in the governmental sector brings about 
a probability of receiving training that is close to 8 per cent higher than if working in the 
private sector. The effect of working in the municipal sector is also positive but not significant 
at the lower levels.
7 To some extent, this supports the suggestion that private firms are more 
restrictive in offering on-the-job training to their employees, perhaps because they are more 
constrained by the need to make profits. Union members have almost 14 per cent higher 
probability than non-members, a result that might support the theory about the monopoly 
power of unions and is consistent with the results of Booth (1991). 
Next consider the variables under the heading workplace characteristics where all the 
estimated effects are clearly significant. If the time to learn to perform the job reasonably well 
is greater than three months, the probability is slightly less than 10 per cent higher than 
otherwise. The decision-maker variable shows the same result and if you acquire new 
knowledge at work, you have a 9 per cent higher probability .  
To sum up, in most cases the results are the expected. It is a bit surprising though that 
there seems to be a lack of the complementarity between education and training that was 
found by Booth (1991) and Arulampalam & Booth (1997). A possible explanation could be 
that the occupational groups, that are likely to be positively correlated with the educational 
levels, absorb the education effect. However, if the occupational groups are excluded, the 
highest education level, academic degree, will still be insignificant although the other 
education levels are significant compared to the reference. For the academic group, it is likely 
that the training is less formal and is integrated in the daily work instead.  
Another  result that is of great interest is that the estimated gender effect is not 
significant at any conventional level which means that according to this model, there is no 
effect of being a woman instead of a man, in contrast to the results by Arulampalam & Booth 
(1997), Booth (1991) and Goux & Maurin (2000) where considerable gender differences were 
found. To further test for potential gender differences, interaction variables have been used. 
All variables have been interacted with the gender variable. Only the interaction variables for 
woman and the two levels of company size are significant at the 5 per cent level. The 
marginal effects are remarkably large with negative signs implying that women in middle-size 
or large companies have a considerably lower probability of receiving on-the-job training than 
                                                                   
7 The estimated coefficient for the municipal sector is significant however at the 10 per cent level and is 
therefore interpreted with some caution.   
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men in the same type of company.
8 The age-interaction variables are not significant separately 
but they are jointly significant at the 5 per cent level.
9 Besides these findings, there are no 
other significant gender differences in the incidence of on-the-job training.  
 
4.2 Estimation of a Count Data Model 
To generate better understanding of the factors affecting the incidence of on-the-job training, 
it is interesting not just to estimate whether an individual receives training or not, but also the 
amount of on-the-job training, i.e. how many days of training he or she receives. The 
dependent variable used in the next part of estimations will be the number of on-the-job 
training days received during the last twelve months. As can be seen from the frequency 
distribution in Table 3, approximately 57 per cent of the sample have a zero count, i.e. they 
have not taken part in any formal on-the-job training during the last year.  
 
Table 3. Frequency distribution of the  number of days of  
on-the-job training received during the last twelve months 





0  1682  56.8 
1    101    3.4 
2    162    5.5 
3    144    4.9 
4    110    3.7 
5    237    8.0 
6      44    1.5 
7      63    2.1 
8      38    1.3 
9      10    0.3 
10    131    4.4 
11+    239    8.1 
     
Total  2961  100 




Given the nature of the dependent variable, i.e. when it takes the form of non-negative integer 
values, a count data model can be used. For a more detailed examination of count data models 
than will be given here, see e.g. Winkelmann & Zimmermann (1995). A common starting-
point for count data models is a Poisson model where the Poisson distribution provides the 
                                                                   
8 The estimated marginal effect of woman*middle-size firm is approximately -0.32 and of woman*large firm is 
about -0.56. 
9 For determining whether one single variable is significant in interaction, the p-value has been used. To test if 
groups of variables are jointly significant, i.e. all variables significantly not equal to zero, Wald tests have been 
performed. The Wald test statistic has a  c
2 distribution with one degree of freedom under the null hypotheses 
that all variables are jointly equal to zero, see e.g. Greene (1997).   
  15   
probability of the number of event occurrences, in this case days of on-the-job training.
10 The 













, , ,... = = =
-l l
0 1 2       (4) 
     
where   
 
 
This statistical model is characterised by a single parameter implying the equality of the 
conditional mean and the conditional variance (equidispersion). There are two assumptions 
that need to be considered. First, individuals are only allowed to be heterogeneous with 
respect to the observed characteristics. Second, events must occur randomly over time. 
Violations of these assumptions might cause overdispersion, i.e. the conditional variance 
exceeds the conditional mean, a feature that is common in economic data.  
Many zeros are a source of overdispersion. One way to try to find out whether the 
Poisson distribution is appropriate or not is to calculate the frequency of each count by using 
Equation 4  with  li replaced by the sample mean and compare the results to the observed 
frequencies.11 The calculation shows that if the data were Poisson distributed, there would not 
be as many zeros as observed. As Arulampalam & Booth (1997) argue, this overdispersion 
can depend on unobserved heterogeneity in the mean function or that the probability of 
receiving on-the-job training is increased as a result of past on-the-job training. Therefore, a 
model which allows for overdispersion needs to be specified.  
A common generalisation of the Poisson model that allows for overdispersion is the 
negative binomial distribution (Winkelmann & Zimmermann, 1995). Here, unobserved 
heterogeneity is introduced in the model by using an error term assumed to have a gamma 
distribution, which leads to a negative binomial distribution for the number of occurrences. 
Formally, li is specified as  
 
l b e i i i X = + exp
' c h                       (5) 
                                                                   
10 For an application of Poisson models, see e.g. Melkersson (1999). 
11 As can be seen from Table 1, the sample mean is 4.7 days of on-the-job training. 
E Y Var Y i i i bg bg = = l   . 
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and the unobserved individual effects are thereby introduced in the conditional mean by the 
disturbance  ei that reflects the cross-sectional heterogeneity. The negative binomial model 
hence arises from the introduction of unobserved heterogeneity into the Poisson model, so in 
negative binomial models, the count variable is believed to be generated by a Poisson-like 
process except that the variation is greater than that of a true Poisson. Following Winkelmann 
& Zimmermann (1995), the negative binomial distribution is given by 
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i.e. the expected value is the same as for the Poisson distribution, but the variance here 
depends both on  l and on  a, which is the common parameter of the gamma distribution. 
Given that a is greater than zero, the variation will be greater than that of a true Poisson. By 
testing whether a is equal to zero or not, we can discriminate between the two models. 
Besides the estimated coefficients of the explanatory variables, an estimate of a is given by 
the estimation of a negative binomial model. A likelihood ratio test of the null hypothesis that 
a  is equal to zero is rejected at the one per cent level and hence the negative binomial 
distribution is to be preferred, as was expected. 
Table 4 shows the results from the estimation of a negative binomial model. Only the 
signs and the levels of significance are interpreted. The dependent variable measures, as 
already mentioned, the number of days of on-the-job training received the last twelve months. 
The explanatory variables used are the same as in the probit estimation and are defined in 
Table 1.  
First, here is evidence for gender differences found because the effect of the gender 
dummy is now significant whereas in the probit estimation it was not. The negative sign 
implies that, according to this model and ceteris paribus, women receive fewer days of on-
the-job training than men. The age variables have the same signs as in the former estimation 
and are both significant.  
E Y Y i i i i i i i i i i ( , ) ( , ) a l l a l l a l = = +
-                      Var   ,
1 2 
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Table 4. Negative binomial estimation. The dependent variable is the number of  
on-the-job training days received during the last twelve months. Robust standard  
errors within parentheses 
Variable  Coefficient 
   
Constant  -0.657 (0.659) 
   
Individual characteristics   
Woman  -0.221 (0.100) * 
   
Age   0.064 (0.028) * 
Age
2 /100  -0.098 (0.035) ** 
   
Elementary school  Ref. 
Lower school certificate   0.359 (0.168) * 
Completed high school   0.536 (0.201) ** 
Academic degree   0.123 (0.211) 
   
Employment characteristics   
Small firm  Ref. 
Middle-size firm   0.114 (0.127) 
Large firm   0.551 (0.174) ** 
   
Part-time  -0.556 (0.148) ** 
   
Blue-collar, unskilled  Ref. 
Blue-collar, skilled  -0.363 (0.181) * 
White-collar, unqualified  -0.429 (0.197) * 
White-collar, low-level   0.363 (0.198)  
White-collar, middle-level  -0.045 (0.172) 
White-collar, high-level  -0.031 (0.199) 
   
Institutional factors   
Private sector  Ref. 
Municipal sector   0.466 (0.130) ** 
Governmental sector   0.508 (0.120) ** 
   
Union member   0.442 (0.152) ** 
   
Workplace characteristics   
Learning-time   0.038 (0.126) 
   
Decision-maker   0.364 (0.107) ** 
   
New knowledge   0.483 (0.105) ** 
   
Estimated a    4.692** 
   
Number of observations   2961 
   
** significant at 1% level   
*   significant at 5% level    
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Next consider the education levels. Here, the coefficients of the dummies for lower and 
completed high school are significant. The signs are positive and consequently individuals 
with a higher education (except for an academic degree) receive significantly more days of 
on-the-job training than individuals with only elementary school education. 
The coefficient for “Large firm” is positive and significant here and should hence be 
assumed to affect the number of training days in a positive way, as was expected from theory 
and consistent with the result of the probit estimation. The coefficient for “Middle-size firm” 
is not significant. The part-time variable shows that working part-time instead of full-time 
clearly reduces the number of training days, just as it was shown to reduce the probability of 
receiving any training at all.  
Moreover, only two of the effects of the occupational group variables are significant 
compared to the reference group. The signs are negative, which implies that skilled blue-
collar workers and unqualified white-collar workers receive significantly less training days 
than unskilled blue-collar workers while the effects of the higher levels of white-collar 
workers are insignificant.  
The effects of the two sector dummies are positive and significant. This implies that 
working in the municipal or governmental sector not only increases the probability of on-the-
job training incidence compared to working in the private sector, but also the number of 
training days. The effect of being a union member is also clearly positive just as the effects of 
two of the workplace variables, the decision-maker variable and the new-knowledge variable.   
To sum up, the estimation of a negative binomial model comes up with some results 
that are the sam e as from the probit estimation, while some results are different. An 
interesting result is that the gender dummy is significant here and hence indicates that given 
these covariates, the training days received are fewer for women than for men.
12 A second 
interesting finding is that the highest education level still is insignificant and hence does not 
support the idea that it is the most well educated who receive most training.  
 
4.3 Estimation of a Hurdle Model 
One limitation of the previously discussed models, is that the zeros as well as the positive 
counts are assumed to be generated by the same process since by using the probit or negative 
binomial approach, the process generating the zeros is modelled in the same way as the 
                                                                   
12 As in the probit estimation, interaction variables have been tried out. It is worth noting that the coefficients for 
two of the occupational group variables (unqualified white-collar and middle-level white-collar) are significant 
with negative signs in interaction with the gender dummy. No other coefficients are significant.  
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process generating the positive counts. In this sample, there are many zero counts since more 
than half of the individuals did not take part in any on-the-job training during the previous 
year. It is reasonable to think that these zeros are generated in a different way from the 
positive counts, implying that the individuals who receive training and those who do not 
systematically differ from each other. There might be one mechanism deciding whether an 
individual receives on-the-job training or not and another mechanism that rules the amount of 
training received when training is given.  
Dividing the sample into two groups, one with those who have received on-the-job 
training and one with those who have not, and examining the means for each group gives 
some support for the above reasoning. For example, the individuals who received at least 
some on-the-job training last year have a higher level of education on average than those who 
had not received training. They also work to a greater extent in the governmental sector and to 
a lesser extent in the private sector, belong more often to the higher occupational groups, 
work to a greater extent in larger companies and a greater part are members of unions. This is 
consistent with the results from the estimated probit and negative binomial models. Also, the 
majority of this group are men, compared to the no-training group where the majority are 
women. The differences that have been pointed out give some evidence for the suspicion that 
there might be systematic differences among those individuals who receive on-the-job 
training and those who do not.  
This might also imply that there are two separate mechanisms governing the incidence 
of on-the-job training and the amount of training. To take this into consideration, a hurdle 
model can be used. Here i t is assumed that a binomial process governs the binary outcome of 
whether or not the individual gets any training and, once the hurdle is crossed, the conditional 
distribution of the positive values is governed by a truncated-at -zero count data model. The  
hurdle model hence consists of two steps. The first step involves estimating the probability of 
receiving on-the-job training. The second step estimates how many days of on-the-job 
training an individual receives given that he or she receives training, i.e. that the parameter in 
the first step takes the value one. In principle, the hurdle could be set at any value, but here 
only the hurdle-at-zero model is discussed.  
Now, a hurdle model will be set up. To a great extent the presentation will follow that of 
Arulampalam & Booth (1997). First, let Yi denote the number of on-the-job training days for 
individual i. Then let f1 be the probability distribution function of the process governing the 
hurdle, i.e. the incidence of training, and let f2 be the probability distribution function of the  
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process governing the number of training days once the hurdle is crossed. The probability 
distribution of the variable Yi is then given by  
 
P P f i ( ) ( ) no training) (Yi = = = 0 0 1                 (7) 
P y P Y y f y f f i i i i i i i i ( ( ) ( ) ( ) / ( ) , , ,...  training days)        y = = = - - = 2 1 2 1 0 1 0 12 3  
   
and the likelihood function is given by  
 
L f f f y f
y y y
= - -






0 1 0 1 0 ( ) ( ) ( )/ ( )         . m r           (8) 
 
The first two terms of the likelihood function refer to the likelihood for training incidence, 
while the third term is the likelihood for positive counts for the number of training days. 
Therefore, the likelihood is separable and the two steps can be estimated separately by first 
maximising the likelihood of a binary model and then maximising the likelihood of the 
truncated variable. For the first step, the probit approach has been chosen. For the second 
step, the strict application of a Poisson or negative binomial model cannot be used since the 
probability would not sum to one when the possibility of a count being equal to zero is 
excluded. Therefore, it is necessary to use an estimation method that truncates at zero. Here, 
the truncated negative binomial distribution is used to estimate the second step, i.e. estimate 
the effects on the number of training days given that training is received. As in the negative 
binomial model in the former part of estimations, the variance parameter a is estimated and is 
shown to be significantly different from zero.  
The results from the estimated hurdle model can be seen in Table 5, where the probit 
estimation and the truncated -at-zero negative binomial estimation are presented together and  
the first and the second step can be compared. In order to avoid confusion no marginal effects 
are presented, only the estimated coefficients. 
First consider the individual characteristics. The coefficient of the gender dummy is 
negative but not significant in the probit estimation and negative and significant in the second 
step. This implies that there are no gender differences in the incidence of on-the-job training 
but given that the hurdle is crossed, women receive less training than men do on average. 
There are some possible explanations for why women would receive less training than men. 
First, they might choose other occupations than men. Second, it might be less valuable for an   
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Table 5. Hurdle model. The first step (1) is estimated with probit and the second step (2) with truncated  
negative binomial. Robust standard errors within parentheses 
 
Variable 
             (1) 
Training incidence 
           (2) 
Positive counts 
     
Constant  -2.021 (0.287) **   2.281 (0.657)** 
     
Individual characteristics     
Woman  -0.051 (0.058)  -0.217 (0.108) * 
     
Age   0.044 (0.014) **  -0.036 (0.031)  
Age
2 /100  -0.056 (0.017) **  -0.016 (0.035)  
     
Elementary school  Ref.  Ref. 
Lower school certificate   0.083 (0.071)   0.307 (0.151) *  
Completed high school   0.257 (0.092) **   0.443 (0.192) * 
Academic degree  -0.084 (0.121)   0.280 (0.208) 
     
Employment characteristics     
Small firm  Ref.  Ref. 
Middle-size firm   0.188 (0.057) **   0.024 (0.115) 
Large firm   0.243 (0.076) **   0.274 (0.144)  
     
Part-time  -0.133 (0.066) *  -0.521 (0.139) ** 
     
Blue-collar, unskilled  Ref.  Ref. 
Blue-collar, skilled  -0.013 (0.075)  -0.460 (0.191) * 
White-collar, unqualified   0.241 (0.102) *  -0.808 (0.229) ** 
White-collar, low-level   0.355 (0.093) **  -0.022 (0.206) 
White-collar, middle-level   0.347 (0.085) **  -0.435 (0.185) * 
White-collar, high-level   0.410 (0.111) **  -0.545 (0.210) ** 
     
Institutional factors     
Private sector  Ref.  Ref. 
Municipal sector   0.106 (0.061)   0.288 (0.123) * 
Governmental sector   0.199 (0.078) *   0.374 (0.121) ** 
     
Union member   0.353 (0.071) **   0.144 (0.132)  
     
Workplace characteristics     
Learning-time   0.251 (0.059) **  -0.234 (0.133)  
     
Decision-maker   0.247 (0.055) **   0.159 (0.107)  
     
New knowledge   0.222 (0.052) **   0.302 (0.099) ** 
     
Estimated a   …   1.696** 
     
Number of observations   2961   1279 
     
** significant at 1% level     
*   significant at 5% level      
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employer to invest in training for women if the returns on the investment are lower, e.g. 
because of more absence from work due to family responsibilities. Third, women might be 
discriminated.  
The age variables only affect the incidence of on-the-job training and not the number of 
days conditional on incidence, while there are education effects in both steps. In the first step, 
only the third education level (completed high school) is significant but given that training is 
received, i.e. in step two, both a lower school certificate and completed high school have a 
positive impact on the days of training compared to the reference. Still, an academic degree 
does not seem to increase either the probability of receiving training or the amount of training.  
The variables under the heading employment characteristics show that the firm size has 
a positive influence on the incidence the number of days but no significant effect on them. 
The part-time variable however is significant with a negative sign in both steps. Working 
part-time reduces both the probability of receiving on-the-job training and the number of 
training days when training is given. 
The coefficients of the occupational groups differ remarkably between the first and the 
second step. Compared to the reference group, unskilled blue-collar workers, the probability 
of receiving training is significantly higher for all the other groups except skilled blue-collar 
workers. Conditional on incidence however, the effect on the number of training days is 
significant and negative for skilled blue-collar workers and unqualified, middle-level and 
high-level white-collar workers. For these groups, the amount of training conditional on 
incidence is consequently lower than for the reference group. 
Next consider the sector variables. The results show that individuals in the public sector 
receive more training than individuals in the private sector. The union member dummy is not 
significant in the second step and is hence just affecting the on-the-job training incidence, just 
as the two workplace characteristics learning-time and decision-maker. The variable “New 
knowledge” is significant and positive for both on-the-job training incidence and the 
conditional number of training days. 
Summing up, most of the estimated effects differ between the first and the second step 
while some are the same. This implies that there are differences b etween those attributes that 
determine on-the-job training incidence and those that determine how much training is given 
conditional that the decision to provide on-the-job training is made.   
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5 Summary and Conclusions 
 
The purpose of this paper is to examine the determinants of the incidence on-the-job training 
and the amount of training received. On the basis of the theoretical framework, a set of 
explanatory variables was chosen and probit, negative binomial and hurdle estimations were 
undertaken using a Swedish micro data set from 1991 containing about 3,000 observations.  
The probit estimation showed that the greater part of the variables, which according to 
theory were expected to have an influence on the probability of receiving on-the-job training, 
really seem to affect the incidence of training. For example, occupational group, public sector, 
firm size and union membership have a positive effect on the probability of receiving on-the-
job training while working part-time is shown to have a negative effect. To answer the 
question of which factors affect the amount of on-the-job training received, a count data 
model was estimated. Women were shown to receive less training than men, ceteris paribus, 
while public sector, union membership and higher education, to some extent, increase the 
number of training days. Occupational group does not affect the amount of training as much 
as it was shown to affect the incidence of training. Taking the examination a bit further, a 
hurdle model was estimated. This model  showed that the factors which affect the incidence 
and the amount conditional on incidence are not necessarily the same.  
The impact of a higher level of education on on-the-job training has been estimated to 
be positive in most cases, but it should be noted that the highest education level used, 
academic degree, is never significant in these models. This contradicts the general opinion 
that it is the highest educated who receive most training. In the models estimated here, where 
the reference group has elementary school only, completed high school has a positive effect 
on on-the-job training incidence and the amount of training, both conditional and 
unconditional on incidence compared to the reference. A lower school certificate increases the 
unconditional and conditional amount of training compared to the reference, but does not 
affect the incidence while the education level academic degree stays insignificant as said 
before.  
Another interesting result is that according to the models estimated here, women receive 
on average a smaller amount of training than men. The reasons for why women receive less 
training have not been investigated and therefore need further examination, but one reason 
might be that they generally have more family responsibilities and therefore are more absent 
from work during certain periods of their working lives. The employer will then be less 
inclined to invest in training for women than for men.  
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